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
State Dept. review completed

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#### DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520



May 10, 1982

## SECRET

Senior Interagency Group No. 23

TO: OVP - Mrs. Nancy Bearg Dyke
NSC - Mr. Michael O. Wheeler
ACDA - Mr. Joseph Presel

CIA Commerce - Mrs. Helen Robbins
Defense - COL John Stanford
Energy - Mr. William Vitale
JCS - MAJ Dennis Stanley
Justice - Mr. F. Henry Habicht
NASA - Mr. Kenneth Pedersen
Treasury - Mr. David Pickford
UNA - Amb. Harvey Feldman
USTR - Mr. Richard Heimlich

NSA

SUBJECT: SIG Meeting Summary of Conclusions

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Attached is the Summary of Conclusions for the meeting of the SIG on the Transfer of Strategic Technology held May 5. It is covered by a Chairman's Note. Provided with the Summary is a copy of the Terms of Reference (TOR) discussed at the May 5 meeting.

L. Paul Bremer, LII
Executive Secretary

### Attachments:

- 1. Chairman's Note
- 2. Summary of Conclusions
- 3. SIG Terms of Reference

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of course be modified.

## CHAIRMAN'S NOTE

Thank you for your attendance at Wednesday's Senior
Interagency Group on the Transfer of Strategic Technology. The
time could not be better to demonstrate that this Administration
intends to act with resolve in controlling the flow of strategic
technology to the Soviet Union.
clearly pointed out the Soviets' massive and centralized technology acquisition program. If we are to be successful in countering this program and thus insuring the protection of our longterm national security interests, we must work together in
controlling the flow of strategic technologies to our potential
adversaries.

Our discussion reflected the fragmented nature of the USG response to this problem. I am sure that you will agree that we urgently require a central forum to discuss and coordinate our approach, although it is clear there is some disagreement over the action to be taken. I believe the Terms of Reference (TOR) for this SIG clearly identify the international aspects of the technology transfer issues and delineate a mechanism that will achieve our goals. If they can be interpreted to go beyond these and to encroach on prerogatives of other departments, they should

In that regard, I must assert the State Department's responsibility in these matters as established by Sections 5(k) and 5(i) of the Export Administration Act (EAA) and by National Security Decision Directive No. 2 dated January 12, 1982, which empowers the Secretary of State to establish SIGs involving foreign policy issues.

The TOR is attached for your review. If you have specific comments, please forward them to my staff. It is my hope that a TOR can be approved at our next meeting in early June so that we can get on to the more pressing policy issues. What is critical is that our response to the national security implications of technology transfer not become hostage to narrow interpretations of the law or to bureaucratic disputes. We must establish a policy review and coordination process that will deal with this serious problem. Congress recognizes the problems we face; we also must face up to our responsibilities.

Sincerely,

James L. Buckley

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## Attachments:

- 1. Organizational Meeting Summary of Conclusions
- 2. Terms of Reference

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